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The Airline Maintenance Mechanic 
THE AIRCINE MAINTENANCE MECHANIC EDUCATIONAL LNFRASTRUCTURE: 
SUPPLY, D E M D ,  AND EVOLVING WDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
Robert N. McGrath and Blaise P. Waguespack 
There is an encroaching crisis in the supply and demand of aviation maintenance labor. This paper reports 
results of a survey of FAA-licensed A&P schools and a survey of airlines and major maintenance outsourcing 
firms. Results largely confirm general expectations. Further analysis found indications of an impending 
shakeout in the extant training idi-astructure. Strategies centered on tapered vertical integration are offered 
as an admittedly imperfect industry-wide solution. 
Trends in the civil air transport (airline) industry make clear 
that rapid growth is practically inevitable. Because of factors 
such as the spread of fie-market philosophies and the 
consequent globalization of industries in general, it has been 
predicted that the total miles flown will rise rapidly in the 
foreseeable future ("Service," 1998). This has driven a rise in 
demand for new aircraft, but the rising demand for new 
aircraft far exceeds the manufacturing sector's ability to keep 
up, and many airlines now ordering new aircraft must wait 
years for delivery ("Manufacturing," 1998). Consequently, the 
already aged and continuously ageing worldwide fleet will be 
taxed by an increasing number of operating hours and cycles 
which, in addition to number of aircraft and preventive 
maintenance requirements, are main strategic predictors of 
aircraft maintenance (Friend, 1992). 
Looking ahead in t m s  of maintenance, then, it at first 
seems f m t e  that a state of immense industry maintenance 
fscilrty overcapacity currently exists, and will continue to exist 
(Ionides, 1999). By one estimate, the current worldwide 
demand for maintenance senices is about 58 million labor- 
hours, while the industry is actively providing about 77 
million, with a current possible total capacity of 155 million 
labor-hours in the industry is available. In the year 2005, 
demand is forecasted to be about 79.5 million labor-hours, 
while total industry capacity will still exceed 181 million 
labor-hours (McKenna & Scott, 1997). 
But apparently, cclabor-hours" as a measure of industry 
capacity has more to do with physical plant than actual labor. 
Forecasts also indicate that over the same period, the supply 
of mechanics with Air&ame and Powerplant (A&P) 
Certificates might become very strained, with some areas 
already reporting diEculties finding skilled mechanics and 
(Gallacher, 1999; Shay, 1999). W e  ihe growth in 
demand for A&Ps between now and 2004 is estimated to be 
close to 34,000, atlrition alone is expected to be about 40,000 
(Jackman, 1996). Though there is probably enougb training 
capacity to support the industry, it is less certain that the right 
structure of incentives exists to draw in the needed new 
technicians in the near h e .  Also, these aggregate figures do 
not take into account obvious heterogeneities in supply and 
demand such as match-ups among, for example, specific skills 
of individuals and related requirements of specific 
organizations. 
Thus, ironically, airline maintenance organizations as well 
as independent providers of outsourced Maintenance, Repair 
and Overhaul (MRO) services, Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs), and other recent entrants into the 
MRO field look to become squeezed by the pressure to 
achieve and maintain high rates of asset utilization (in periods 
of overcapacity, typically accomplished through lowering 
one's prices), and the pressure to maintain desired levels and 
types of maintenance skills and resulting service quality. What 
this shortage forebodes is a supplier's market w k e  the price 
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of maintenance labor will likely be bid upwards. In other 
words, maintenance organizations will likely find themselves 
competing with each other for the right technicians 
(exacerbating their direct and some indirect labor costs,) while 
at the same time the prices these providers will be able to 
charge their customers for maintenance services will 
simultaneously be pressured to fall as long as aggregate 
maintenance overcapacity exists. This condition, of course, 
will be present in an environment that is already very 
competitive in more ordinary terms ("MRO Competition," 
1996). 
In the United States, at least, many people feel that 
unrestrained fiee market forces will ultimately resolve 
dilemmas of this type. For example, one might assume that 
the coming dsparity between the demand for maintenance 
labor and its supply will bid up the average wage for 
maintenance services, and that this should directly incentivize 
a correct rate of entry by people of the right skills fiom the 
general working population, and that labor supply and demand 
will equilibrate in textbook fashion, right on time. On the 
other hand it could also be argued that airworthiness is 
something of a public good, and that an optimal strategy for 
the airline industry at-large would involve innovations that 
improve the productivity of the existing workforce. Such 
changes could include equipment upgrades @lanes and 
engines) that improve the reliabilities of the equipment and 
decrease the need for basic maintenance, andlor make 
proactive improvements to the existing industry training 
idfastructure that produces maintenance technicians. 
In short, it is perhaps the case that conditions of poor, 
problematic, or just heterogeneous maintenance quahty 
among maintenance providers in the airline industry do not 
enhance overall industry vitality. At some point in the debate, 
many feel that cooperation, rather than (or in addition to) 
canpetition, is a more enlightened tack. Indeed, it has become 
plain that in some aspects of business, cooperation through 
hsimnents such as consortia, alliances, and more permanent 
forms of partnering has become popular, profitable, and 
conducive to the greater socioeconomic good, even in areas 
traditionally earmarked by stiff competition (Philips, 1997). 
These perspectives are obviously arguable, even among 
professional economists and public policy practitioners. It is 
not the authors' immediate purpose to participate in a 
theoretical advancement of the argument, but to accept the 
reality of the encroaching problem and present the initial 
results of a research collaboration between two institutions in 
the airline industry maintenance training idiastructure. 
Observing developments in this collaboration, even fiom the 
earliest phases, will h o p e m  contribute to the ongoing 
resolution of the labor shortages and skill heterogeneity in the 
industry. After all, the best managers foresee problems and 
have solutions ready when difliculties arrive. 
THE STUDY 
Researchers in the Business Administration Department at 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University were approached by 
a major U.S. airline to help investigate the nature of a 
forecasted shortfall of Ahfiame and Powerplant (A&P) 
mechanics, expected to become especially critical for that 
airline around the year 2000. At that time the airline expects 
that about 25% of the maintenance workfbrce will attrit or 
retire; especially retire, meaning that the proportion of 
experience lost would be even worse. Up to 42% of related 
management could be lost. These trends were known to be 
determined by internal labor market factors which were 
largely beyond any realistic control, so management at the 
airline opted to search for howledge about external patterns 
which could contain opportunities for innovative solutions. 
The research was lead by a Professor of Marketing and 
Business Research Methods, who organized graduate students 
enrolled in an MBA in Aviation course, into teams which 
performed highly structured telephone surveys. The survey 
instruments were developed in consulation with: (1) the 
airline, represented by a former line technician and A&P 
holder now a financial analyst and a representative fiom the 
Human Resources department specializing in technician 
employment (2) a Professor of Strategic Management who is 
an instructor in the area of Aviation Maintenance Mangement 
and former Air Force Oacer responsible for engine 
maintenance programs; (3) students in the class, which 
included two A&P holders, one an avionics instructor at the 
university and (4) and a review of the applied and trade 
literature. 
Two telephone surveys were conducted in the Spring of 
1998. The first queried airlines as well as major providers of 
outsourced aircraft maintenance. Participants were identified 
before the research began on the basis of market share and 
total volume in consultation with the airline representative. 
The general purpose was to ascertain current A&P labor 
conditions and associated expectations. This was a survey of 
some of the present and future demand characteristics of A&P 
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The second survey queried institutions granting A&P 
certificates and conducting related maintenance training 
consistently over a period of 20 years. FAA Advisory 
Circulars since 1979 were canvassed for this purpose, the 
latest being AC 147-2DD issued in March 1997. The general 
putpose was to (a) rea&m the FAA census, and (b) ascertain 
the nature of the current maintenance training infrastructure. 
This, in essence, was a survey of some of the characteristics 
of the supply of A&P labor. Results are described in the 
following section. 
RESULTS 
The folowing caniers agreed to participate in the survey of 
A&P labor demand: 
Alaska Airlines American Airlines 
America West Airlines Continental Airlines 
words, participation was enthusiastic, but not all firms would 
or could hazard an answer to each question. However, 
summary participation in each question was very high, so 
slight variations do not threaten the modest purposes of this 
Paper. 
Table One and Table Two presents results of both surveys. 
Some edrhng of the questions was needed to be concise here, 
but the tables capture the intent of each question as asked on 
the survey hstmment The Tables present the questions in the 
order they were asked during the phone interview. Information 
not indicated in the tables (as noted) is as follows. 
In the survey of demand ('Table One), in question 4 @o you 
confer A&P licenses?), it was interesting that three carriers 
required trainees to successfully complete training within a 
specified time frame; specifically, two carriers required 
comuletion within six months. and one within 18 months. 
Delta Airlines DHL Airways Four outsourcing h n s  that conferred A&P licenses also gave 
Northwest Airline Southwest Airlines trainees deadlines; specifically; one required completion 
Trans World Airlines United Parcel Service 
US Airways within six months, two within 12 months, and one within 24 Air Tran Airways 
Hawaiian Airlines Midwest Airlines months. With respect to questions five and six, firms were 
Reno Air Horizon Air permitted to spec@ more than one main source of A&P 
Business Emress Ever~een applicants, and more than one target of A&P recruiting, so 
The following maintenance providers (outsourcing firms) 
also agreed to participate: 
Aero Corporation Aero Union 
Aircraft Support and Parts Associated Air Centre 
Avtec Hamilton Aviation 
Midcoast Mobile Aerospace 
Pemco BF Goodrich Aerospace 
Santa Barbara Aerospace Commodore Aviation 
T W O  
With respect to the survey of A&P labor supply, it was of 
immediate interest that not all schools identified in FAA 
Advisory Circulars were still in operation. First, it was noted 
that while'one authoritative source indicated the presence of 
220 schools (United States Department of Transportation & 
FAA PSDOT & FAA], 1993), only 185 were listed in the 
most recent FAA circular. Ofthese 185 schools, 164 agreed 
to participate. Two declines to participate, three were exiting 
the training industry because of low enrollment, and the 
remainder could not be contacted. 
In participating in the survey, there was some slight 
variation in which firms answered which questions. In other 
percatages total above 100. With respect to questions 1 1, 12, 
and 13, participants were encouraged to make additional 
comments. Ofthose fums that chose to commenf criticisms 
of new hires (question 1l)'tended to focus on overall 
inexperience, low skill levels, and lack of needed specialized 
skills. Comments about other noticeable problems (question 
12) tended to focus again on lack of experience, and a lack of 
avionics and electrical skills. Further elaborations (question 
14) repeated these themes, plus evidenced general concerns 
about present supplyldemand imbalances (overall A&P 
shortages), devolving skill levels, and the siphoning off of the 
best talent to the largest operators. 
SURVEY ANALYSIS 
Demand. Even a cursory examination of the questionnaire 
data yielded interesting results. First, and as probably would 
be erqpected, the airlines were much larger organizations than 
the outsourcing firms, measured as the mean number of 
mechanics and A&Ps; 2,8 17 mechanics and 1,920 A&Ps for 
the airlines to 318 mechanics and 203 A&Ps, for the 
MROfhms. hportantly, such a difference in size is indicative 
of an imbalance in the bargaining power for labor, much 
favoring the airlines. 
Standard statistical tests were used to gain a better 
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understanding of the differences in other data. Percentages of 
yeslno m e r s  were evaluated as tests of standardized 
fiequencies using the chi-square statistic (Lapin, 1981). 
Differences between population means were evaluated by 
employing the Student t statistic, in a method specifically 
suited for small sample sizes. The most conservative 
assumptions were made; i.e., tests were two-tailed (Lapin, 
1981). 
The airlines and the outsourcing firms were found to be 
significantly different in the following ways. On balance, the 
pattern indicates that the airlines are willing to exercise their 
bargaining power: 
-- Question 1: In contrast to what the large 
differences in means (2,817 v. 3 18, and 1,920 v. 203) might 
intuitively indicate, airlines employed mechanics at only a 
slightly higher rate (t = 2.25, greater than the threshhold of 
2.048 at alpha = .25). The rate at which the two groups 
employed A&Ps was, actually, very marginally non- 
sigdicant (t = 1.90, ~2.056). While the means indicated an 
extreme difference, in other words, small sample sizes and 
wide variances around the means made the "apparent," wide 
differences between statistically non-signdicant. 
-- Question 2 : Outsourcing firms were slightly less 
likely to perceive self miliciency (at df = 1 and alpha = .05, 
the chi-squared threshold was 3.841; chi-squared = 4.00). 
-- Question 3 : The airlines were much more highly 
unionized (chi-squared = 43.12). 
-- Question 4: Airlines were much more likely to 
require applicants to possess licenses (chi-squared = 43.12). 
-- Question 5: Because of the "in-house" category 
(1 1 % for airlines and 42% for outsourcing firms), the main 
source of job applicants was likely to be different (at df = 4 
the threshold was 9.488; chi-squared = 19.36). 
-- Question 6: Because of the "VoTech category 
(61% for airlines and 25% for oursourcing firms), recruiting 
patterns were likely to be different (at df = 8 the threshold was 
15.507; chi-squared = 38.55). 
-- Question 7: The airlines were more likely to 
require a written employment exam (chi-squared = 33.76). 
-- Question 13 : Oursourcing firms were slightly 
more likely to foresee an increase in the future demand for 
A&Ps (chi-squared = 6.18). 
-- Question 16: Outsourcing firms were slightly 
more likely to have plans for conducting in-house training of 
A&Ps (chi-squared = 6.40). 
The two populations were not found to be 
sigmticantly different in terms of 
-- Question 2: The number of additional A&Ps 
needed (t = 1.67, <2.160). 
-- Question 8: Requirements for a practical exam 
(chi-squared = .04). 
-- Question 9: Requirements for a probationary 
period (chi-squared = .30). 
-- Question 10: Base and overtime pay (t= 1.08 for 
both parts, <2.056 and 2.093, respectively). 
-- Question 11: Perceptions of problems with the 
skills and knowledge of new-hires (chi-squared = 4.50). 
-- Question 12: Perceptions of other problems with 
new-hires (chi-squared = 1.56). 
-- Question 13: Percentage increase in A&Ps 
forecasted (t = 1.56,<2.056). 
-- Question 15: The presence of training 
partnerships and alliances (chi-squared = 1.54). 
-- Question 17: Percent of applicants passing initial 
job screening (t = 1.16, ~2.048). 
Supply. Refening to the results of the questio~aire w e n  to 
the Part 147 Schools (Table Two), it was interesting that an 
overwhelming number of schools provide what seem to be 
generalist A&P licenses, in the sense that almost 85% 
c a n f d  only A&P li-, while much smaller percentages 
offered only an "A," a "P," or all three possibilities of A, P, 
and A&P. More telling, perhaps, was that only about 28% 
t a i l d  their programs to speci6c clients; and here, it is worth 
nolingthat most of this percentage was really only "specific" 
to categories of clients (such as airlines or general aviation), 
not specific organizations. In light of the demand described 
above, such an aggregate lack of focus could indicate a 
suboptimal degree of "closeness to the customer," or 
comhation with the needs of the consumers of maintenance 
labor -- despite a contradictory conclusion which might be 
inferred from noting that about half maintained training 
partnershipS/alliances, and internshipslco-op programs. 
There were signs of stability and uniformity in the training 
infrastructure. Over 90% of new A&Ps were evidently 
coming fiom a concentration of three m& sources: in order, 
Community Colleges, VoTech schools, and Universities. 
Almost two-thirds of the sample were state-supported. Again, 
about half had internshiplco-op programs, 88% offered 
h c i a l  asistance programs, and 9 1 % offered job placement 
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assistance. Most (85%) foresaw an increase in future 
enrohent. 
More worrisome was the variation in exam pass rates and 
rates. The exam pass rate varied fiom 15% to loo%, 
with a mean of 92.2%. The attrition rate varied fiom 0% to 
90%, with a mean of 19%. The observer is immediately 
compelled to speculate as to some of the possible causes of 
such variatian, given the high level of guidance and oversight 
provided by the FAA. For example, some schools could be 
much more H c u l t  than others for a wide variety of reasons; 
andlor schools could vary considerably in their quality. Or 
large heterogeneities could exist in student populations, 
though this seems more doubtfid. Other reasons could exist as 
well. Otherwise, there were additional signs of fkagmentation 
and wide variation in the training infrastructure. Most telling 
was that the largest school was delivering about 350 A&Ps a 
year, or about .03% of the 1 1,000 A&Ps which enter the field 
annually ("Pilots," 1993). Most other schools were much 
smaller stiU. Very few, then, could be theoretically ascribed 
much bargaining power, but it must be conceded that it might 
be senseless to allude to the bargaining power of schools since 
individuals, not schools, bargain for the sale of maintenance 
labor. On the other hand, it is within the first author's 
professional interest to be well aware of just how much 
common sense A&P trainees employ in making careful and 
calcuhhg evaluations of which schools are worth attending, 
so the point is much the same. 
One-fifth of the sample was tuition-driven; tuition ranged 
widely fiom $500 to $32,000, with a mean of about $6,864. 
The duration of programs ranged fiom 10 months to 60 
months, with a mean of 22.4 months. Experience in training 
in aviation maintenance ranged from 1 to 70 years, with a 
mean of 3 1.3. Class sizes ranged fiom about 4 to 50; some 
schools employed only part-time instructors, while other 
schools employed only full-time instructors. However, it 
might be a matter of perspective as to whether these 
conditions represent a lack of coordination and 
standardization, or merely a healthy variety. If the latter is 
assumed, however, then it becomes puzzling why only 28% 
tailor their programs to specific clients. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper opened with a general description of the much- 
improved health of the aviation industry as a whole, but 
quickly pointed to an impending shakeout in MRO because of 
a squeeze between intense pressures to economize versus 
escalating labor costs. The data suggests that the training 
infrastructure, as well, may be poised for a similar shakeout, 
or at least a rationalization and restruc!m-ing. The reasoning 
follows, with alternative strategies for its management. 
Though the demand for A&P mechanics may become 
critical in the future, that situation has not yet arrived. In the 
near-term, it looks as if maintenance schools will continue to 
struggle for enrollment. The finding that 85% of schools 
foresee an increase in near-texm enrollment may contain an 
optimistic bias. At least, the airlines and maintenance 
outsourcing fums were not nearly as optimistic that they 
would be able to satisfy their future needs. Of course, it may 
simply be that the demand is rising faster than the supply is 
rising (but that both are indeed rising), which would 
accommodate everyone's predictions. 
But another (or additional) possibility is to fist note that the 
number of schools has begun to decline. The recent 
population of schools may have been as high as 220 (USDOT 
& FAA, 1993). In 1994 the number of reported Part 147 
schools was 193. That number has since decreased and the 
most recent data indicated 185 schools remaining, and the 
phone survey found two more schools poised to exit. So if the 
demand for technicians is rising, the decline in the number of 
schools warrants an explanation. 
Understanding some of the more classic dynarmcs of 
industry evolution helps (Porter, 1980). When 
industriedmarkets are growing, it is normal for individual 
f m s  to do what is necessary to grasp larger portions of 
market share, or to at least keep up with industry growth at 
least in absolute terms. However, when industrylmarket 
growth eventually subsides, and providers of resources to that 
market continue to expand, the aggregate capacity in the 
supply of resources eventually exceeds aggregate market 
demand, leaving the supplier industry at-large in a condition 
of overcapacity. Wdiug up a stable market among providers 
who, on average, have more capacity than the market has 
demand, leaves providers in a bad cost crunch. Earlier, it was 
described how MRO firms are in such a situation. 
Very similar forces apply to the training inf.?astructure that 
supplies MRO with labor; except a shakeout due to poor 
cap* dkation looks like it will be caused by the scarcity 
of raw materials (students), rather than a paucity in demand. 
But there is more. Conditions are changing in ways that 
suggest that the major employers of A&Ps are not willing to 
settle for poorly trained mechanics, almost no matter how 
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scarce they might become. 
Classically, when "buyers" (in this case, airlines and 
outsourcing firms) are sophisticated (as, apparently, are 
recruiters and human resources personnel) and can make h e -  
tuned assessments of the VALUE of resources being acquired 
(in this case, new A&Ps), two generic types of firms (in this 
case, schools) tend to survive; firm that are poised to deliver 
high-quality, high.-differentiated, high-value-added 
products/services, and those that are poised to undercut 
everyone else in terms of cost, and generaIly price (Porter, 
1985). The providers (schools) which can not deliver either 
high-qdtylhigh-maentiation-at-a-g-price, OR a low- 
cost, ostensibly low-price gdservice, are positioned to fail 
and exit. In short, buyers (airlines and other consumers of 
maintenance labor) should be expected to rationalize-out the 
overcapacity (of schools) over time, forcing the relatively 
poor value-adders (mediocre schookr) to exit. 
This may be what has already begun to occur in the A&P 
training Sastructure. As the supply of people entering the 
A&P field falls, but as the demand rises, increasingly 
sophisticated reading efforts of the airlinedothers should be 
expected to target what each firm, given its challenges and 
strategy, will deem appropriate value in a new-hire. One can 
not assert with much confidence that airlines and major 
outsourcing firms will do nothing about the impending labor 
crisis except preparing to outbid one another. Wisely focusing 
on value, not volume, at least some will be keenly interested 
in hirjllg only the best mechanics, adjusting to remaining labor 
inadequacies by substituting inferior-quality labor for 
technological improvements in the inherent maintainability of 
equipment (and, ultimately, dispatch reliability), andfor by 
making managerial innovations that improve the productivity 
of the maintenance workforce. 
In other words, the nature of the demand indicated in these 
m e y s  indicates that buyers of maintenance services are not 
interested in just getting "warm bodies." Respondents 
consistently voiced as much, if not more, concerns about the 
shills and competencies of future technicians as about the 
potential number of technicians. As one might expect, the 
airlines, firms with deeper pockets and better bargaining 
positions for labor, showed less anxiety than the outsourcing 
firms. Several long-tenn results of this situation should be, to 
those who have faith in the invisible hand of the forces behind 
supply and demand, that (a) on the demand side, there will 
continue to be a siphoning-off of the best talent to the airlines 
and other areas where the need for maintenance labor is highly 
concentrated in pwerful firms (consolidating, global players 
in MRO, OEMs, etc.), and @) on the supply side, either the 
highest-quality, or the most cost-effective schools (or perhaps 
both, if ingeniously managed) should sunrive an encroaching 
shakeout which, as stated, may have already begun. In the 
long run, the high-costhigh-value-adding schools may 
gravitate to serving the airlines, while the low-cost schools 
may gravitate to general aviation and less-wealthy aviation 
segments. 
It is arguable, however, whether this is socioeconomically 
optimal. Maybe the best mechanics should go to the firms 
with the greatest exposure to the general public, and that this 
should actually be encouraged. Or, one might argue, ordinary 
market dynamics should be left to sort it out, and that there 
should be no additional institutional creation impeding equal 
access to labor markets. In a way, the issue seems to revolve 
around equality (equal access), and equity (fairness on all 
accounts), which can not be decided here. 
At any rate, schools may be individually correct that future 
enrollment will increase, but if this is mostly because other 
schools are simply exiting the training ~astructure.  The 
situation may not necessarily be that the total supply of 
mechanics will increase, or that the benefits will be equitably 
disstbuted throughout the industry. But, as some schools and 
institutions leave the field, others now see a chance for their 
enr011ements to increase. 
Short of being able to significantly alter the aggregate 
number or the quality of the people interested in becoming 
aviation mechanics, the authors suggest that one way to 
embark upon a less painful rationalization of the extant 
t r h g  infrastructure is for the demand-side to consider 
verticallbackward integration, or at Ieast tapered or quasi- 
integration, and for the supply-side to do some keen analysis 
of the value they individually deliver, and hone products to the 
demands of most likely buyers, for example through more 
focused curricula and partnering (complementary forward 
integration). 
Baclcward integration refers to any decision aimed at 
restructuring an arrangement with me's suppliers that 
attempts to reduce supply-related uncertaiuties. Outright 
aqukhon of one's supplier is one example, as is deciding to 
enter the upstream business through internal growth. Of the 
known possible benefits of vertical integration, some that 
seem to especially pertain to the present situation include: 
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economies of combined operations, improvement in the 
ab&y to trust the supplier, greater economy of monitoring the 
supplier for adherence to expectations, better assurance of a 
steady flow of supply, a reduction in overall slack, reduction 
in purchasing costs and bargaining, better capital utilization, 
enhanced ability to fine-tune and differentiate the overall 
productfservice, and full capturing of the profitability of the 
supplier. Potential costs include: increased operating leverage 
(too many eggs in one basket), reduced flexibility to 
environmental change, capital investment Qustifling hurdle 
rates and opportunity costs of capital), foreclosure of 
alternative sources of supply, maintaining balance in potential 
capacity differentials, dulled marketlconsumer incentives of 
a captive relationship, the distractioddilutim of managerial 
talent and organizational competencies, and the possibility of 
a "bad apple" phenomenon, or the vulnerability to 
contamination of one organization by another organization's 
inferior performance standards (Porter, 1980). 
But organizations are apt to partially, as well as fully, 
integrate backward when the combinations of benefits and 
costs suggest it. Tapered integration generally refers to a 
strategy of becommg one's own supplier, but not supplying all 
of one's own demand (as opposed to full integration). 
Potential advantages include a lower elevation of fixed costs, 
reduced risks of locking-in to one supplier, the maintenance 
of some market discipline on the captive supplier, the 
development of a detailed understanding of relevant costs, and 
the ability to still externalize the risks of fluctuations in 
demand (Porter, 1980). For example, an airline could acquire 
an existing Part 147 school (and in impending conditions, at 
a very attractive price), or open its own training academy, to 
fulfill its minimum forecasted needs for maintenance labor, 
accommodating upswings in business cycles through external 
recruiting -- meanwhile tailoring the academy's program to 
the specific operational requirements of the airline, and 
making efficient use of everyone's time and other resources. 
Quasi-integration has a similar intent, but generally refers to 
a mutual investment (hence financial stake) between firms 
who share a common goodwiU, and who contact each other 
frequently in the natural course of their relationshqs. 
Advantages, again, can be found in various cost economies, 
the absence of any necessary exclusive commitment to either 
supply or purchase, and a lower overall capital investment. 
For example, a major consumer of maintenance labor might 
directly invest in an existing school, technically maintaining 
its business independence but otherwise enjoying the benefits 
of a very high level of cooperation and coordination, all 
lubricated most importantly by mutual goodwill. 
Given the mutual goodwill that obviously exists between the 
training ~astructure and its customer base, quasi-integration 
might be the theoretically more correct paradigm to pursue. 
Obviously, since each consumer of maintenance labor is 
potentially idiosyncratic, and as there seems to be so much 
variation in the supplier base, permutations of solutions are 
almost endless. It is left to individual strategists to consider 
their own requirements. 
In addition to achieving firm-level benefits, the industry as 
a whole might benefit from a trend towards forward and 
backward integration. Overall training capacity could be 
maintained, instead of severely shaken-out and generally 
injured in the short-term, to the detriment of being able to 
satisfy long-term growth in demand. But remaining capacity 
could be rationalized around, and tailored to, the specitic 
needs of buyers, on a case-bycase basis, rather than providing 
an undershd population of genedkts who apparently are not 
optimally valuable new-hires. 
However, caveats are cerkdy  in order as well. As stated 
ealier, a a d  toward integration could leave the consumers of 
maintenance labor who do not have the ability to integrate in 
an only greater predicament. General aviation and tked-base 
operators may become particularly strained, or economically 
locked-out fimn fair access to the high-costlhigh-value adding 
schools, settling to recruit at what has sometimes been 
referred to as the "diploma mills" ("A Greater," 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
Globalization will continue to change the structure of the 
aviation industry at many points of value-addition throughout 
its complete supply chain. Educationltraining is a supplier 
industry that is just as vulnerable to the forces of supply and 
demand as its downstream customers. In addition to 
globalization drivers, the simple scarcity of a key resource -- 
skilled labor -- will shape industry restructuring as well. 
l'roponents of "free madcet" solutions should be aware that the 
smartest entrepreneurs respond proactively to foreseeable 
changes; they do not wait for gross dis-equilibria to trigger 
reactive equilibration, at serious socio-economic cost. 
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Table One - Survey of Airlines and MRO Firms: Demand Survey 
Airlines n Oukmrced Maintenance Firms n 
Min. Max Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median 
1. How many mechanics are currently employed? 45 11,0002,817 750 18 13 1,086 318 222.5 12 
How many licensed A&Ps are employed? 38 9,960 1,920 630 17 8 600 203 100 11 
2. Is the number of A&F's suflicient for present needs? Yes - 50%; No - 50% 18 Yes - 36%; No - 64% 11 
If not, how many more A&Ps do you need? Mean Max Mean Median Min Max Mean Median 
13 450 96 22.5 8 4 800 180 100 7 
3. Is maintenance unionized? Yes - 65%; No - 35% 17 Yes - 8%; No - 92% 12 
4. Do you require applicants to have an U P  license? Yes-89%;No- 11% 18 Yes - 42%; No - 92% 12 
If not, do you train A&Ps (gant licenses)? 1 of2& 2of7train 
5. What are the sources of A&P job applicants? Military 67% 18 67% 
(respondents asked to check all that applied) VoTech 50% 50% 
College 39% 42% 
In-house 11% 42% 
Other 22% 12% 
6. What is the main target of U P  recruiting? Newspaper 
(respondents asked to check all that applied) Trade Fair 
HI@ School 
VoTech 
Corn.. Coll. 
University 
Military 
Agency 
Other 
7. Do you require a written employment exam? Yes - 44%; No - 56% 18 Yes - 8%;No - 92% 12 
8. Do you require a practical employment e m ?  Yes - 24%; No - 76% 17 Yes - 25%,No - 75% 12 
9. Is there a probationary period for new-hires? Yes - 94%; No - 6% 18 Yes - 92%; No -8% 12 
If yes, how long in (months)? Min. Max Mean Median Min. Max. Mean. Median 
3 6  4 3  18 2.5 6 3 3 12 
10. What is the sh-hg A&P base pay ($/hr.)? 9.50 19.00 13.00 13.20 18 9.00 16.00 12.00 1125 10 
What is Stamng A&P overtime pay? 15.00 29.00 21.00 20.38 12 13.50 24.00 19.00 20.00 
9 
11. Do you have problems with skills & knowledge Yes - 61%; No - 39% 18 Yes - 75%; No - 25% 12 
Of new-hires? 
12. Are there any other noticeable problems? Yes - 33%; No - 67% 18 Yes - 25%; No - 75% 12 
13. Do you foresee an increase or decrease in number of Yes - 94%; No - 6% 18 Yes - 100%; No - 0% 10 
A&Ps needed in the U.S. airline indusby? 
If yes, by what %? Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median 
3.5 20 14 17.5 18 10 50 20 15 10 
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14. [Qualitative descriptions of concerns] See text. See text. 
15. Do you maintain A&P training lxalnerships/aUiances? Yes - 17%; No - 83% 18 Yes - 25%; No - 75% 12 
16. Do you have plans for in-house, formal A&P training? Yes - 11%; No - 89% 18 Yes - 25%; No - 75% 12 
17. What % of applicants pass initial job screening? Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median 
3 90 44 36 18 3 80 31 20 
18. What % of applicants identified as quahfied are hired? 3 95 44 50 13 1 100 60 70 12 
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Table 2 - Survey of FAR Part 147 Schools: Supply Survey 
1. Which FAA AMT licenses do you confer? M a m e  Powerplant 
62% 7.48 
2. Classification of your program. High School 4.88% 
VoTech 32.32% 
Comm. College 39.63% 
University 18.29% 
Other 4.88% 
3. m o r  source of funding. State Govt. 65.89% 
Federal Govt. 3.88% 
Tuition 20.93% 
Industry 4.88% 
4. Duration of A&P program (in months). Min. Max. 
10 60 
Mean 
22.6 
5. A&P student/faculty ratio. 4 50 
6. Number of full-time instructors 
Number of part-time instructors 
7. Tuition (excluding dorm ($). 500 32,000 6,862 
Additional fees? 
If yes, how much? 
Yes - 80%; No - 20% 
30 2,950 
8. Fimgcial aid available? Yes - 88%; No - 12% 
9. Internships/Co-ops offered? Yes - 45%; No - 55% 
10. Do you offer job placement assistance? Yes - 91%; No - 9% 
1 1. Is the Fogram tailored to specific clients? Yes - 28%; No - 72% 
Mean. 
92.2% 
12. A&P exan pass rate. Min. Max. 
15% 100% 
1 3. Athition rate. 0% 90% 
14. Years of experience training aviation maintenance. 1 70 
15. How many students successfully complete annually? 5 350 
16. Do you foresee an increase or decrease in enrollment Increase - 85% 
In the next three years? Decrease - 7% 
No change - 8% 
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